Monday, August 4, 2014

Rich Coleman farts hydrogen sulphite, Ahhhh: Then does Cart wheels and issues duct tape to seal school classroom windows ....

What a relief!?  Passing the gas out, pain in the ass dissipates, not into the stratosphere though, ground hugging, under the cover of darkness.

In the 1970's an enterprising, young, television (BCTV)  reporter (Mike McCardell???) was doing impromptu, on the street, interviews on a variety of topics like ..... "Madam, Do YOU Fart?"

"Mike" wasn't being selective, focusing on just one gender, the last pitch was to a prim and proper woman (50's), heavy coat, hat with a small feather for colour, handbag clutched to her chest.  Her reply to Mike was NO, NO, NO to the question on passing of gas.  Finally the reporter instinct took over, armed with experience of past answers, he offered a logical opinion on the release of gas.

"Madam do you realize that if you don't FART, you'd explode!" ...... Do you fart?  "No!"

Rich Coleman is in that same state of denial when it comes to fracking crack being fed to Mother Earth, surreptitiously slipping hydrogen sulphide out under the cover of night, accompanied, always, with the smell of sewage.


In a Stephen Hume's follow-up article on the BC Government (Rich Coleman) allowing sour gas wells within 500 metres of schools (Northern BC)(coming soon to Fraser Valley), Coleman ignored this in the report: "urged the province to regulate minimum setbacks of 1,500 metres between schools and sour gas facilities."

..... More than 1,900 children in nine schools scattered across northeastern B.C. were at possible risk from sour gas wells either planned or already drilled. That made it a pretty good story.

It sure got reader reaction, especially when the report also said emergency response plans for schools had to be improved — that simply supplying teachers with duct tape to seal windows or parking a bus in the schoolyard wasn’t good enough.

The Sun followed that story up with another.

It reported that in 2010 the province had actually planned to regulate combined safety setbacks and enhanced management zones from public facilities like schools of up to 2,000 metres.

However, the buffer zones later turned out not to be what was promised by then-minister Blair Lekstrom, but the paltry 100 metres that the UVic researchers said were far inferior to safety buffers required by regulators in the U.S. — but which industry said were perfectly adequate.  ........ - Stephen Hume - Vancouver Sun July 23, 2014

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Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association Limited

Application of quantitative Risk assessment for planning high sour wells or working in an H2S Field close to populated areas.   Dr. Elie Daher, United Safety


Page 1 of 9

H2S or Hydrogen Sulfite is an IDLH (Immediate Danger to Life and Health) poisonous gas and its exposure to humans leaves serious effects that could range from death to lasting physiological and neurological sicknesses.  H2S gas is also odorless, colorless and heavier than air which makes detection by humans very difficult.

Page 2 of 9  Something that BCOGC doesn't mention .....

Another technical failure in Canada (2) in 2009 caused the release of 30,000 cubic meters of gas containing 6200ppm of H2S.       The nearby community was NOT alerted until six hours after the release causing massive concern over procedures for public protection.  Residents near the wellsite reported smelling sewer like odours and hearing a "jet-like" noise.  Approximately 22 minutes after the sudden failure, the emergency shutdown (ESD) valve at the well closed automatically but was unable to stop the flow of gas from the failed tee because the ESD was downstream of the failure point.  The control room received and H2S alarm and notification of ESD closure at an adjacent well located on the same well pad approximately 25 metres from the leaking well.  Two operators donned personal protective equipment (PPE) and self contained breathing appraratus (SCBA) and manually closed the well head valves upstream of the failed tee.  The tee failed due to internal erosion resulting from abrasion caused by fracture sand suspended in the high velocity gas stream.  Five residences were located within a 1.34 km radius emergency planning zone.  A total of 18 residents evacuated the area during the release.
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In residential areas, none apply to schools, there are varying degrees of Response Planning to be taken into consideration when it comes to distances:

EPZ
Emergency Response Planning
EPZ
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 Some other acronyms
 Emergency Response Planning "Wyatt" ERP
  Emergency Awareness Zone EAZ
1.34 km EPZ
Provincial (BC only) Emergency Program PEP

Page 2 of 3 PEP must be informed
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BCOGC interactive Graphic Map, Tracks and creates Stats:

2010 BCOGC stats


2008 BCOGC stats

Change in Royalties, eh, less drilling, capping, ...

"29" in one circle; 181 incidences all told for 2007

2006 ..... 298 incidences


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BCOGC A5-7-77-14 L W6M aka Swan
Blue Dots Residences

BCOGC Swan



Third Party EXPERT:

NOT alerted until six hours after the release of 30,000 cubic metres

How did BCOGC explain the Incident.... by not including, not mentioning, the 30,000 cubic metres in it's Graphic Interactive Map (left side for "details")(right side bottom right Blue Dot well)



Failure Investigation Report: Encana Swan Well site: Wallis and Klemmer Road


Failure Investigation Report    Incident Map

22 November 2009 Failure of Piping at EnCana Swan Wellsite A5-7-77-14 L W6M

February 4, 2010

Oil and Gas Commission Failure Investigation Report (Wellsite A5-7-77-14) February 2010

Table 1B – Incident Time Log

Time

Detail

Approx.
2:30 AM

A local resident (1) smells what they thought was sewage. The resident did not make any notifications.

Approx.
3:30 AM

Resident (1) went outside 3 times to determine source of the smell but was uncertain where the smell could be coming from. The resident did not make any notifications.

Approx.
4:00 AM

Resident (1) hears a loud roaring sound from inside the house sounding like a jet flying over head. The resident did not make any notifications.

Approx.
5:00 AM

Another local resident (2) outside checking on livestock hears a loud roar but does not detect any odours. The resident does not make any notifications.

Approx.
7:00 AM

A local resident (3) out hunting drives up Klemmer Road and can smell gas; assumes some work is being done. The resident does not make any notifications.

Approx.
8:00 AM

Resident (2) goes back outside and detects a pungent rotten egg smell and hears a roaring sound, but assumes a company is doing some work. The resident does not make any notifications.

Approx.
8:30 AM

Resident (3) returns to area via Klemmer Road and observes gas cloud and detects strong odours. Advises inhabitants at nearby residence to evacuate.  Resident (3) drives through the gas cloud and heads East on Merrick Road and sees the gas coming off the wellsite and parks his pick-up about 300 metres cross wind on Merrick Road.

8:36 AM

Resident (3) does not have any EnCana emergency numbers and decides to call 911 to report a gas release at an EnCana wellsite.

8:38 AM

Sudden failure of a 60.3 mm Tee at the wellsite (noted on SCADA data for well pressure and flowrate).

Approx.
8:45 AM

Resident (3) contacts wife at home and suggests she start calling all neighbours to evacuate their homes. Resident (3) makes additional notifications to local residents and passersby advising the area is unsafe and instructs Resident (1) to park her pick-up at the junction of Klemmer Road and Wallis Road to restrict access and warn local residents to not drive through that area. Resident (3) then drives to junction of Wallis Road and Blockline Road and parks vehicle to restrict access and wait for more information.

9:00 AM

Resident (1) dials 911 to advise RCMP of a gas release and is transferred to fire service dispatch; resident is instructed to stay at present location until told otherwise. RCMP confirm they have received odour complaints from residents and are on the way.

9:05 AM

EnCana Control Room receives alarm showing the ESD valve at A5 has closed.

9:10 AM

EnCana control room receives high alarm from adjacent well (A6) confirming ESD at A6 has closed due to H2S detection of 12.82 PPM.

9:10 AM

EnCana dispatches operator to investigate (Operator 1).

9:15 AM

RCMP arrive; then proceed to set up road blocks at 2 separate locations. An industry medic truck arrives at Klemmer Road and Wallis Road and assembles with several others at intersection to await further instructions. Several others arrive at the intersection including a work crew and grader operator.

9:30 AM

Several residents gathered at the intersection of Wallis Road and Klemmer Road Dawson Creek evacuate including resident (1). Resident (1) states that gas odour was very strong at the highway near Gumbo Gulch Ranch.

9:38 AM

Local EnCana operator (Operator 2) receives a call from a local resident (4) informing him there is a leak.

9:45 AM

Operator 2 notifies EnCana control room of call. At the same time another local resident (5) arrives at Operator 2’s residence to inform him of the leak.

9:45 AM

RCMP makes first contact with EnCana stating several local residents have phoned in complaining of strong gas odours.

9:47 AM

EnCana control room operator contacts EnCana Operator 3 and dispatches him to the incident.

9:48 AM

EnCana Community Relations Advisor receives a call from local resident from SE 18-77-14-W6M and is informed by the resident he is evacuating to Pouce Coupe.

9:50 AM

Operator 2 arrives at the junction of Wallis Road and Klemmer Road and meets an EnCana construction foreman there. Operator tests ambient atmosphere with gas monitor and detects no H2S.

9:50 AM

Operator 2 then proceeds to drive slowly down Klemmer Road with window open and gas detector on. No H2S detected.

9:52 AM

Operator 1 requests assistance from another Operator (Operator 4). Operator 3 observes gas plume from A5 well at this time.

9:53 AM

Operator 3 confirms leak and proceeds to nearby compressor station to get an ignition kit.

9:57 AM

RCMP notifies EnCana that a resident (5) on Merrick Road has contacted the RCMP with an odour complaint.

10:00 AM

Operator 1 reports the leak is visible from Blockline Road. He requests that the wells and the 05-07 Block Valve be shut in.

10:00 AM

Local resident (6) phones Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) to report gas leak. PEP classifies as Level 1 and assigns incident #902235.

10:00 AM

EnCana Community Relations Advisor reports leak to EnCana control room. EnCana senior management notified.

10:02 AM

Operators 1, 2 and 4 arrive near the incident but cannot approach due to ongoing gas release.

10:05 AM

PEP places call to Commission Emergency Officer and MOE codes incident as a Code 1 Provincial.

10:06 AM

Operator 4 advised by local resident (3) that residents north of the incident site have evacuated and gathered at the intersection of Wallis Road and Klemmer Road.

10:06 AM

Operators 1, 2 and 3 determine a need to physically enter the site using SCBA’s to stop the flow of gas. Operators 1 and 3 will enter the site under observation from Operator 2.

10:07 AM

EnCana classifies incident as a Level 1 Emergency.

10:10 AM

Operators 1 and 3 attempt to shut in the A5 well. They get within 25 metres and can see that the tee has failed upstream of the ESD.

10:15 AM

Operator 4 meets with residents gathered at the intersection of Wallis Road and Klemmer Road. Advises residents to proceed to Tomslake hall. EnCana personnel man the roadblock at this location.

10:16 AM

EnCana identifies five residences within the 1.34 km emergency planning zone (EPZ) and initiates contact with all residents advising them that they may evacuate voluntarily to the Tomslake hall.

10:20 AM

Operator 1 and 3 evacuate the site due to problems with one of the SCBA’s.
Operator 5 arrives at site.

10:30 AM

EnCana provides a situation update to the RCMP.

10:35 AM

Operator 4 drives to the five residences within the EPZ to confirm evacuation.

10:42 AM

EnCana notifies Ministry of Energy, Mines, Minerals and Petroleum Resources (MEMPR) of incident.

10:45 AM

Operators 3 and 5 successfully shut in well.

10:45 AM

Evacuation reception centre opened at Tate Creek Community Centre in Tomslake.

10:49 AM

EnCana notifies PEP to report incident.

10:55 AM

EnCana provides a situation update to the RCMP.

11:00 AM

Commission Inspector contacts EnCana to receive additional information.

11:13 AM

EnCana provides an e-mail situation update to senior MEMPR officials.

12:30 to 12:33 PM

Peace River Regional District notified, mayor of Dawson Creek notified.

12:54 PM

Residents advised they may return to their residences.

Oil and Gas Commission Failure Investigation Report (Wellsite A5-7-77-14) February 2010

Page 14 of 24
And Coleman wants Teachers to use Duct Tape?


British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission  ALL THEIR Reports

BCOGC Incident Map explained

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Why is the public the ears, noses, and eyes of Encana, BCOGC, Coleman?


Heavens to Betsy, what were to happen if there were multiple leaks? in the Fraser Valley?

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